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The	antitrust	case	against	Android	as	viewed	by	a
company	insider
In	a	recent	Vox	column,	six	antitrust	consultants	describe	the	European	Commission’s	case	against	Android,	hailing
it	as	a	“milestone”	of	antitrust	for	the	telecommunications	industry	(Caffarra	et	al.,	2018).		In	fact,	it	is	more	of	a
millstone	than	a	milestone.
The	colloquial	definition	of	“millstone”	is	a	“heavy	burden”,	and	of	course	the	case	is	a	burden	for	Google.	But	it	is
also	a	burden	for	the	entire	Android	ecosystem	of	equipment	manufacturers,	carriers,	app	developers,	and	end
users.
The	consultants	claim	that	“[t]he	central	concern	in	the	Android	case	is	that	Google’s	contracts	with	smartphone
manufacturers	made	access	to	its	Google	Play	app	store	contingent	upon	the	manufacturers	pre-installing	Google’s
search	app	and	making	Google	Search	the	default	search	engine	on	their	devices.”
That	statement	is	not	accurate.	The	Commission’s	announcement	mentioned	“default”	in	two	places,	one	of	which
says	Google	Search	is	currently	the	default	on	Apple	iPhones	(true)	and	the	other	of	which	says	Google	Search	is
the	default	on	the	Google	Chrome	browser	(also	true).	However,	contrary	to	the	consultants’	assertion,	the
Commission	does	not	claim	that	Google	required	its	search	engine	to	be	the	default	on	Android	devices.
Google	offers	the	entire	Android	operating	system	and	a	variety	of	apps	to	original	equipment	manufacturers	(OEMs)
for	free.	OEMs	who	want	to	pre-install	the	Play	Store	app	were	required	to	pre-install	the	Google	Search	App	and	the
Chrome	browser	as	well,	but	there	was	no	obligation	to	make	Google	search	the	default	for	the	device.	OEMs	could
preload	other	search	services	and	browsers	and	make	them	the	default	if	they	chose	to	do	so.
This	barter	arrangement	was	good	for	both	sides	of	the	transaction:	OEMs	got	the	popular	Play	Store,	and	Google
ensured	that	its	users	had	at	least	one	way	of	accessing	Google	search.	This	is	critical	for	Google	since	it	is	the
revenue	from	search	ads	that	pays	for	the	development	and	maintenance	of	the	open	source	Android	operating
system.	Unlike	Apple,	which	makes	billions	from	hardware	sales,	or	Microsoft,	who	generates	significant	revenues
from	licensing	fees,	Google	offers	the	Android	operating	system	and	its	popular	apps	to	OEMs	for	free.
Caffarra	et	al.	(2018)	also	complain	that	the	presence	of	Google’s	mobile	search	app	made	it	difficult	for	rival	search
engines	to	acquire	a	sufficient	volume	of	queries	to	train	their	models.	But	all	the	search	engine	rivals	had	several
years’	worth	of	data	from	their	desktop	search	engines,	so	this	is	hardly	credible.
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The	authors	ask,	“Is	default	status	sufficiently	important	to	‘foreclose’	rival	search	engines?”	They	claim	that	it	is,	and
point	to	the	2014	Yahoo-Mozilla	agreement	as	evidence:	“When	Yahoo	paid	Mozilla	for	default	status	in	Firefox	34,	it
saw	a	20	percentage	point	increase	in	its	share	relative	to	users	of	Firefox	33.”
It	is	true	that	when	Firefox	made	Yahoo	the	default	search	engine	in	2014,	its	use	initially	increased.	But	as	users
realised	what	had	happened,	they	switched	back	to	their	preferred	search	engine	and	Firefox	search	share
declined.	In	2017	Mozilla	terminated	its	agreement	with	Yahoo	two	years	ahead	of	time,	saying	in	a	lawsuit	that
“Yahoo	Search	consistently	failed	to	retain	users	and	search	volume	over	time,	reducing	the	potential	revenue	[for
Mozilla]	under	the	Strategic	Agreement”.	Apparently	being	a	default	is	nowhere	nearly	as	important	as	the
consultants	seem	to	think.
No	one	contests	the	claim	that	being	a	default	may	affect	usage,	other	things	being	equal.	But	other	things	are	never
equal.	For	example,	in	the	EU	Google’s	share	of	desktop	search	is	high,	so	it	is	natural	that	this	user	choice	carries
over	to	mobile	devices.	Would	you	really	want	a	different	search	engine	on	your	desktop,	laptop,	tablet	and	mobile
phone?
In	fact,	in	countries	where	non-Google	search	engines	have	a	large	query	share,	pre-installation	has	little	impact	on
usage.	In	Korea,	the	first	thing	many	users	do	when	they	purchase	a	mobile	phone	is	to	download	Korean	language
search	engines	such	as	Daum	and	Naver.	In	the	US,	Bing	is	the	default	search	engine	in	the	Windows	Edge	browser
on	the	desktop,	but	many	Windows	users	download	and	use	other	browsers	and	other	search	engines.	And	in
Russia,	Yandex	is	a	highly	popular	search	engine	and	if	it	is	not	pre-installed	on	their	mobile	phone,	many	people
download	it.	(By	the	way,	the	consultants	acknowledge	that	they	worked	for	Yandex	in	cases	involving	both	the
Russian	antitrust	authorities	and	the	European	Commission.)
Users	expect	a	ready-to-run	experience	when	they	turn	on	their	new	laptop	or	mobile	phone,	so	pre-installation	of
apps	is	the	norm.	Apple	pre-installs	39	apps,	all	of	which	are	from	Apple;	most	Android	phones	have	11	Google	apps
pre-installed	and	most	OEMs	install	dozens	more	of	their	own	apps,	or	apps	from	developers	that	have	paid	the
OEM	to	pre-install.
As	a	matter	of	fact,	Google	went	out	of	the	way	to	offer	users	choice:	the	Mobile	Application	Distribution	Agreement
(MADA)	did	not	prevent	OEMs	from	pre-loading	rival	services	and	displaying	them	prominently.	Furthermore,	users
could	easily	hide	pre-installed	applications	and	download	rival	apps	in	a	matter	of	seconds.	Last	year
mobile	browsers	such	as	Opera	Mini	and	Firefox	were	downloaded	more	than	100	million	timesfrom	the	Play	Store
(Pichai	2018).
The	authors’	focus	on	“general	purpose	search	engines”	like	Google	and	Bing	is	also	misplaced.	As	far	as	the
economics	is	concerned,	there	are	two	sorts	of	search:	commercial	and	non-commercial.	There	is	no	revenue	from
“non-commercial	search”	virtually	by	definition.		All	the	revenue	comes	from	ad	clicks	associated	with	“commercial
search”.	This	is	no	different	than	ad-supported	media	like	TV,	radio,	newspapers,	and	magazines	–	the	ads	pay	for
content	in	these	traditional	media,	just	as	ads	pay	for	the	production	of	“general	search	results”	in	a	search	engine.
Nowadays	many	mobile	users	search	for	products,	restaurants,	hotels,	and	other	commercial	services	using
specialised	applications,	bypassing	general	purpose	search	engines	all	together.	General	purpose	search	engines
don’t	just	compete	against	each	other,	they	also	compete	with	these	specialised	apps	for	commercial	search	–	and
commercial	search	is	the	only	kind	of	search	that	makes	money.	It	is	because	of	this	intense	competition	that	users
have	access	to	a	wide	variety	of	free	services	and	a	rich	set	of	ways	to	access	those	services.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	appeared	originally	on	Vox,	the	policy	portal	of	the	Centre	for	Economic	Policy	Research
(CEPR).
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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